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1 Introduction
There seems to be a large agreement in the economics profession to consider
that unemployment in European countries is due to the combination of distinct
factors, such as labor market rigidities and economic turbulence (Ljungqvist
and Sargent, 1998; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers,
2000; Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999). It is, indeed, widely accepted that one
of the main explanations for European unemployment is the presence of mis-
match between ¯rms and workers (Drµeze and Bean, 1990; Layard et al., 1991;
Pissarides, 2000). Another reason for unemployment that has also been put
forward is the growing uncertainty prevailing on product demand due to in-
creases in consumers' idiosyncracies and the inability of ¯rms to adjust their
labor policy to such demand °uctuations. This idea has been developed within
the framework of implicit contract theory with the aim of explaining wage
rigidity and, in turn, unemployment for some realizations of demand (Rosen,
1985; Stiglitz, 1986; Haley, 1990). In this paper, we attempt to bring together
some of the main ingredients that can be found in these two strands of labor
economics within a partial equilibrium microeconomic framework.
It is our contention that workers have heterogeneous skills while ¯rms have
di®erentiated job requirements. Indeed, as argued by Stevens (1994), ¯rms
have an incentive to di®erentiate their skill requirements in order to obtain
monopsony power in the labor market. Once it is recognized that ¯rms and
workers are heterogeneous, it is reasonable to assume that the process of job
matching drives the formation of wage in the labor market (Hamilton et al.,
2000). As a result, ¯rms have oligopsonistic power in the labor market, which
allows them to charge wages lower than the competitive level. Furthermore,
when labor market rigidities prevent the possibility of state-contingent wage
contracts and foster permanent job tenures, ¯rms must commit to wages and
employment before the realization of product demand. In such a context, they
may be viewed as agents who make investments in risky assets, as in Markowitz
(1959). This implies that ¯rms are risk-averse, but here, diversi¯cation being
impossible, ¯rms protect themselves by imposing wage cuts.
To be more precise, we show that, when training costs are large and the
volatility of price °uctuations is high, the labor market equilibrium involves
unemployment in the absence of wage-contingent contracts. Indeed, ¯rms are
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able to set wages below marginal productivity because (i) they can use their
monopsony power on workers who have a good match in the labor market and
(ii) they insure workers against the risk inherent to the product market by pay-
ing them a wage independent of demand shocks. In this way, we uncover some
of the microeconomic underpinnings of unemployment. We also show that both
mismatch and random shocks combine to increase unemployment. The rela-
tive importance of both explanations is an empirical issue. For example, the
work of Lillien and Hall (1986) and of Manacorda and Petrogonlo (1999) shows
that both explanations are relevant, depending on the particular country un-
der consideration. In our model, wages and employment are determined before
the realization of product prices and are, therefore, not state-contingent. This
assumption is made to capture the idea of rigidity in the labor market in that
¯rms are not able to adjust wages and employment according to °uctuations in
product demand. This implies that employed workers are completely insured
against price volatility at the expense of a possible higher unemployment level.
In this paper, we adopt a research strategy that is becoming increasingly
popular in labor economics. Following Salop (1979), this emerging body of
literature models heterogeneity by means of a circle along which both workers'
skills and ¯rms' needs are distributed (Kim, 1989; Bhaskar and To, 1999; Ma-
rimon and Zilibotti, 1999; Fiorillo et al., 2000; Hamilton et al., 2000; Thisse
and Zenou, 2000). What distinguish the present paper from existing ones (in-
cluding ours) are the following two basic features. First, we provide a complete
description of the market outcome, involving either full employment or unem-
ployment. Second, we highlight the role of (European) institutions that pre-
vent ¯rms to adjust wages and employment to random °uctuations in product
demand. This in turn allows us to focus on the combination between mismatch
and demand uncertainty as potential explanations for unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced
in the next section. In section 3, we determine the full-employment market
equilibrium whereas section 4 develops the equilibrium with unemployment.
Section 5 concludes with some policy implications.
3
2 The model
Consider an industry with n ¯rms producing a homogeneous good sold on a
competitive market and facing demand-induced price °uctuations. To express
the resulting uncertainty, we suppose that the market price ep is a random
variable whose mean is chosen to be 1 (without loss of generality) and variance
is ¾2 > 0. As in Sandmo (1971), greater price uncertainty is measured by a
mean-preserving spread in prices, that is, an increase in ¾2.
A ¯rm is fully described by the type of job it o®ers. This means that a job
is a collection of tasks determined only by the technology used by the ¯rm.
Firm i's (= 1; :::n) skill requirement is denoted by xi. Labor is the only input
and production involves constant returns to scale. There is a continuum of
workers with the same level of general human capital but with heterogeneous
skills. There is no a priori superiority or inferiority among workers who are just
di®erent in the type of work they are best suited for. The characteristics of a
worker are summarized by her skill and are denoted by x. When unemployed,
workers obtain the same level of unemployment bene¯t b ¸ 0. Each worker
supplies one unit of labor provided that her wage net of training costs (her
earnings) is greater than or equal to b.
We consider a labor market in which the information structure is assumed
to be as follows. First, ¯rms are not able to identify the skill type of workers
prior to hiring but they know the distribution of worker skills; this typically
happens in a thick labor market. Second, workers know their own types and
observe the ¯rms' skill needs. Hence, workers are able to evaluate their training
costs but ¯rms are not.
Each ¯rm has a speci¯c technology such that workers can produce output
only when they perfectly match the ¯rm's skill needs. Since workers are het-
erogeneous, they have di®erent matchings with the ¯rm's job o®er. Thus, if
¯rm i hires a worker whose skill di®ers from xi, the worker must get trained
and her cost of training to meet the ¯rm's skill requirement is a function of the
di®erence between the worker's skill x and the skill needs xi. Workers pay for
all the costs of training. The reason for this is to be found in the information
available to ¯rms and workers. First, ¯rms derive their market power from the
fact that workers have to pay at least some part of their training costs (just
as ¯rms selling a di®erentiated product have market power on the neighboring
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customers). Indeed, would ¯rms pay for the whole training cost, workers would
no longer be induced to take jobs in the most suitable ¯rms. Since ¯rms do not
observe workers' types, they would run the risk of implementing unpro¯table
hiring policies. Further, since the supply of a worker is perfectly inelastic, ¯rms
are not able to o®er a wage menu. This in turn implies that workers must pay
for their whole training costs.1
As mentioned in the introduction, the skill space is described by the cir-
cumference C of a circle which has length L: Individuals' skills are continuously
and uniformly distributed along this circumference; the density is constant and
denoted by ¢. The density ¢ expresses the thickness of the market, whereas
L is a measure of the heterogeneity of workers. This implies that the size of
the labor market is measured through two parameters, L and ¢, the impact
of which on the market outcome is not necessarily the same. Firms' job re-
quirements xi are equally spaced along the circumference C so that L=n is the
distance between two adjacent ¯rms in the skill space.
When the matching is perfect, the worker produces q units of the output.
The more distant the skill of a worker from the ¯rm's skill requirement, the
larger the training cost. More precisely, the training cost is given by a linear
function s jx¡ xij of the di®erence between the worker's skill x and the ¯rm's
skill requirement xi, where s > 0 is a parameter inversely related to the e±-
ciency of the training process. After training, all workers are identical from
the ¯rm's viewpoint since their ex post productivity is observable and equal
to q by convention with q > b for the model to make sense. Consequently,
each ¯rm i o®ers a wage to all workers, conditional on the worker having been
trained to the skill xi. Each worker then compares the wage o®ers of ¯rms and
the required training costs; she simply chooses to work for the ¯rm o®ering
the highest wage net of training costs.
As mentioned in the introduction, we assume that state-contingent wage
contracts are not allowed by labor market institutions or that such states are
not veri¯able (to our knowledge, state-contingent wage contracts are not imple-
mented in Europe). In other words, ¯rms commit to wages and employment
before price realizations, thus implying that wages and employment are not
1For ¯rms to cover a fraction of the training costs, they must be able to observe workers'
types. If this is so, one should expect some bargaining to arise between ¯rms and workers
on both training costs and wages, as in Hamilton et al. (2000).
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random variables. In such a context, ¯rms bear the whole risk associated with
random price °uctuations so that it is reasonable to assume that they display
a risk-averse behavior. In addition, as ¯rms make wage and employment deci-
sions before producing, liquidity constraints may even lead a risk-neutral ¯rm
to behave as if it were risk averse (Drµeze, 1987, ch. 15). This argument is sup-
ported by empirical studies showing that many ¯rms have an imperfect access
to the capital markets, especially when they are not large, and must therefore
bear part of the risk associated with their production activity (Fazzari et al.,
1988; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989).
In order to derive closed-form solutions, we use the mean-variance utility
model (Markowitz, 1959; Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992). This is admittedly a
restrictive approach, although this model has been shown to have a fairly good
descriptive power in several economic ¯elds, and to be a special case of the
expected utility model in which the utility is the negative exponential function
- thus having a constant absolute degree of risk aversion equal to a ¸ 0 - and
the random variable is normally distributed (Eeckhoudt and Gollier, 1995).
In addition, it allows us to provide a full and detailed characterization of the
market equilibrium.
3 Full employment equilibrium
Firms choose simultaneously their wage level, (w1; ::; wi; ::; wn). The net wage
is therefore equal to wi¡s jx¡ xij. Firms understand that workers choose to be
hired by the ¯rms which give them the highest net wage. As a result, they hire
all the workers who want to work at the prevailing wages, since they know that
these workers are willing to adjust to their skill requirement. Furthermore, wi
cannot exceed the productivity q for otherwise ¯rm i would make a negative
pro¯t.
Let i be the representative ¯rm. Given the wages wi¡1 and wi+1 set by the
two adjacent ¯rms, ¯rm i's labor pool is composed of two sub-segments whose
outside boundaries are given by marginal workers x and y for whom the net
wage is identical between ¯rms i ¡ 1 and i, on the one hand, and ¯rms i and
i+ 1, on the other. In other words, x is the solution of the equation:
wi ¡ s(xi ¡ x) = wi¡1 ¡ s(x¡ xi¡1)
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so that
x =
wi¡1 ¡ wi + s(xi + xi¡1)
2s
(1)
In this case, ¯rm i attracts workers whose skills belong to the interval [x; xi]
because the net wage they obtain from ¯rm i is higher than the one they would
obtain from ¯rm i¡ 1. Clearly, workers belonging to the interval [xi¡1; x] are
hired by ¯rm i¡ 1. In a similar way, we show that:
y =
wi ¡ wi+1 + s(xi + xi+1)
2s
(2)
Firm i's labor pool thus consists of all workers with skill types in the interval
[x; y]. Hence, its pro¯ts are de¯ned by:
e¦i = Z y
x
¢(epq ¡ wi)dx = ¢(epq ¡ wi)(y ¡ x) (3)
As said in the foregoing, we consider a mean-variance utility function so
that ¯rm i's payo® is as follows:
Vi = E(e¦i)¡ a
2
V ar(e¦i) (4)
where a ¸ 0 expresses the absolute degree of the ¯rm's risk aversion and wheree¦i is de¯ned by (3). Because the terms a and ¾2 will always appear together
throughout this paper, we ¯nd it convenient to set À ´ a¾2, which may be
viewed as a measure of the impact of uncertainty on ¯rms' behavior. Of course,
À > 0 if and only if ¯rms are risk averse; otherwise À = 0.
Expression (4) may be written as follows:
Vi = ¢(q ¡ wi)(y ¡ x)¡ À
2
¢2(y ¡ x)2q2 (5)
Since all workers take a job, the outer boundaries of ¯rm's labor pool are given
by (1) and (2). Hence, (5) is continuous in (wi¡1; wi; wi+1) and concave in wi.
Therefore, there exists a Nash equilibrium in wages. Applying the ¯rst-order
conditions yield:
@Vi
@wi
= ¢
"
¡ (y ¡ x) + (q ¡ wi)
Ã
@y
@wi
¡ @x
@wi
!#
(6)
¡À¢2q2 (y ¡ x)
Ã
@y
@wi
¡ @x
@wi
!
= 0
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Combining (1), (2) and (6), we obtain:
wF = q ¡ Àq2¢L
n
¡ sL
n
(7)
It is worth writing (7) as follows:
q = wF + s
L
n
+ Àq2
¢L
n
(8)
In this expression, the LHS stands for the value productivity of a worker while
the RHS is composed by three elements. The ¯rst one (wF ) is the marginal
cost, the second one (sL=n) measures the oligopsonistic exploitation of labor,
whereas the last one may be viewed as the risk premium that ¯rms levy on
workers because of their commitment to wage and employment before the re-
alization of uncertainty. This premium increases with the worker productivity
q as well as the density ¢ (see below for an explanation), whereas it decreases
with n because the risk is spread over a larger number of ¯rms.
The following comments are in order. First, when ¯rms are risk neutral
(À = 0), price °uctuations do not a®ect ¯rms' utility and the wage is given
by q¡ sL=n. Observe that in this case (risk neutrality), the worker density ¢
has no impact on the equilibrium wage while the equilibrium wage falls with
the size of the skill space. By contrast, when ¯rms are risk averse (À > 0),
increasing ¢ has a negative impact on wage. Stated di®erently, when state-
contingent contracts are not allowed, a larger labor market (both in terms
of workers' density and skill space) leads to a lower wage. This seemingly
surprising result can be explained by the fact that, at the full employment
equilibrium, each ¯rm is committed to hiring the fraction 1=n of the labor force,
regardless of its size ¢L, while facing the same uncertainty on the product
market. It must then be that the premium rises with ¢L (the same holds for
an increase in q) and decreases with n, as shown by our results.
Second, when ¯rms are risk averse, the equilibrium wage decreases with the
degree of risk aversion and the variance of the output price. In other words,
industries with greater price uncertainty are likely to charge lower wages. This
is because, at the full employment equilibrium, risk-averse ¯rms share with
workers the risk generated by price volatility and because the sharing varies
with the attitude of ¯rms toward risk.
Third, changing n and s have more direct and intuitive implications. In-
deed, wF decreases with s because ¯rms have more market power on the work-
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ers whose skills are close to their skill requirement,2 whereas it increases with n
because the average matching is better when the number of ¯rms is larger. In
fact, when n becomes arbitrarily large, the wage tends to q. The competitive
model of the labor market is thus the asymptotic version of the spatial model
of job assignment. Last, since there is no pro¯table deviation by any single ¯rm
at a Nash equilibrium, competition among ¯rms precludes the emergence of
poaching e®ects. Likewise, no worker can be better o® by changing jobs since
she would have to incur new training costs while receiving the same gross wage.
We must now determine under which conditions there is full employment
at the equilibrium wage candidate (7). To do that, we set
©(q) ´ q(1¡ Àq¢L=n)
which is a quadratic function of q with ©00(:) < 0 as long as À > 0. Clearly, we
have bq ´ argmax
q
©(q) =
n
2À¢L
©(bq) =max
q
©(q) =
n
4À¢L
(9)
Proposition 1 Assume that ¯rms have a mean-variance utility. Then, there
is full employment at the equilibrium wage
wF = q ¡ À¢q2L
n
¡ sL
n
if and only if
0 < À <
n2
2¢L(2nb+ 3sL)
(10)
Furthermore, the equilibrium value of each ¯rm's payo® is given by
V F = ¢
L2
n2
Ã
À¢q2
2
+ s
!
which is always positive.
Proof. The domain of parameters for which there is full employment at the
equilibrium candidate (7) is such that:
wF ¡ sL
2n
¸ b , ©(q) ¸ b+ 3sL
2n
(11)
2When s = 0, workers are not di®erentiated and there is no strategic competition betwen
¯rms. As a result, workers are paid at their marginal productivity minus the risk premium.
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A necessary and su±cient condition on the parameters for (11) to hold is :
max
q
©(q) = ©(bq) > b+ 3sL
2n
where ©(bq) is de¯ned by (9). After some manipulations, this inequality is
equivalent to (10).
Condition (10) insures that under the equilibrium wage (7), there is always
full employment. In other words, if the variance of ep is not too large, everybody
will accept to work at the equilibrium wage. The condition (10) is intuitive
since each ¯rm must set a su±ciently high wage to attract all workers in its
labor pool. This is so when the demand is not too volatile. On the other hand,
the existence of big random shocks in market demand leads to a labor market
equilibrium with unemployment. Observe also that, ceteris paribus, condition
(10) is more likely to be satis¯ed if the number of ¯rms n is large and if À,
¢, L, s and b are not too large. Stated di®erently, when ¯rms are very risk
averse, or there are many workers in the labor market, or the unit cost of
mismatch is large, or the unemployment bene¯t is high, it is likely that there
is no equilibrium with full employment (see section 4).
It is worth pointing out an interesting di®erence between the cases of risk
neutrality (À = 0) and risk aversion (À > 0). When À = 0, the condition
reduces to q ¸ b + 3sL=2n, i.e., the productivity of workers must be large
enough for the full employment con¯guration to arise. On the contrary, when
À > 0, there is full employment for all the values of q such that ©(q) ¸
b + 3sL=2n, that is, q must belong to the interval [q0; q1] described in Figure
1 (the size of this interval depends on the value of the exogenous parameters
À, n, ¢, L, s and b). This means that full employment occurs when the
productivity of a worker takes intermediate values. Indeed, when q is very
large, the premium becomes too high for the ¯rms to be able to set wages that
sustain full employment. This is a rather surprising result because one would
expect that a rise in workers' productivity is favorable to full employment
when the output market is competitive. However, this intuition disregards the
impact that price uncertainty has on the wage-setting process. Because they
show risk-aversion, ¯rms become reluctant to hiring more productive workers
because they must pay them a higher wage, regardless of the realized price for
their output.3 By contrast, risk-neutral ¯rms behave as if the product price
3Though our model does not deal with di®erences in quali¯cation across workers, this
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were ¯xed and equal to its mean.
4 Unemployment equilibrium
We now consider an economic environment in which not all workers take a
job, while the remainder of the setting is similar to the one described in the
foregoing section. Consequently, each ¯rm acts as a monopsony in the labor
market. The corresponding outer boundaries of its labor pool bx and by are such
that by ¡ bx = 2(wi ¡ b)=s.4 The pro¯t function of a monopsony ¯rm i is given
by: e¦i = 2¢(epq ¡ wi)wi ¡ b
s
and its payo® is as follows:
V U = 2¢(q ¡ wi)wi ¡ b
s
¡ À
2
¢2q2
"
2(wi ¡ b)
s
#2
(12)
which is concave in wi. By taking the ¯rst-order condition of (12) and com-
bining the equations in a similar way as in the full-employment case, we easily
obtain:
wU =
qs+ b(s+ 2À¢q2)
2s+ 2À¢q2
(13)
Observe ¯rst that the impact of À on the monopsony wage (13) is the same
as for the Nash equilibrium wage (7) and for the same reason. However, s
now has a positive impact on wU whereas it had a negative one on the full
employment equilibrium wage (7). This is because ¯rms no longer compete
in the labor market. The training costs being borne by the workers, ¯rms
must compensate them when s increases in order to attract enough workers
(the labor pool shrinks as s rises). On the contrary, as shown by (1) and (2),
the size of the labor pool is independent of s at the full employment wage
equilibrium. Thus, under uncertain product demand, when the unit cost of
mismatch becomes larger, monopsonistic ¯rms are induced to rise their wages
whereas oligopsonistic ¯rms are induced to reduce their wages. Moreover, the
result seems to be in accordance with recent empirical analyses suggesting that employment
of the most skilled workers is fairly sensitive to random shocks.
4When s = 0, we have seen that the model with full employment remains meaningful.
However, this is no longer true for the unemployment case because, workers being undi®er-
entiated, the concept of isolated monopsonies makes no sense anymore.
11
monopsony wage (13) falls with ¢. Indeed, since each ¯rm ¯nds more suitable
workers in its vicinity, it can a®ord to pay a lower wage because workers need a
lower compensation for their training cost. Finally, the unemployment bene¯t
positively a®ects the monopsony wage since workers are more reluctant to take
a job and thus ¯rms' monopsony power decreases when b rises.
It remains to check when there is unemployment for the equilibrium can-
didate (13).
Proposition 2 Assume that ¯rms have a mean-variance utility. Then, there
is unemployment at the equilibrium wage
wU =
qs+ b(s+ 2À¢q2)
2s+ 2À¢q2
with an unemployment level given by
u = ¢
Ã
L¡ n q ¡ b
s+ À¢q2
!
(14)
if and only if
À >
n2
4¢L(nb+ sL)
(15)
Furthermore, the equilibrium value of each ¯rm's payo® is given by
V U =
¢(q ¡ b)2
2(s+ À¢q2)
which is always positive.
Proof. The domain of parameters for which there is unemployment at the
equilibrium candidate (13) is such that:
wU ¡ sL
2n
< b (16)
It readily veri¯ed that (16) is equivalent to:
©(q) < b+
sL
n
In this context, a necessary and su±cient condition for (16) to hold is thus
given by:
©(bq) < b+ sL
n
where ©(bq) is de¯ned by (9). It is readily veri¯ed that the condition above is
equivalent to (15).
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This proposition shows that the variance of ep must be large enough to
guarantee that there is unemployment in equilibrium. Indeed, if the demand is
not volatile, monopsonistic ¯rms will set su±ciently high wages for all workers
to be willing to work. This captures the idea that both demand shocks and
labor market institutions precluding state-contingent wage contracts may be
responsible for equilibrium unemployment. In this sense, our results are in
accordance with the recent literature that put forward economic turbulence
and labor market rigidities as the main causes for the European unemployment
(Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).
It is useful to write wU as follows:
wU =
q + b
2
¡ q ¡ b
2
À¢q2
s+ À¢q2
because (q + b)=2 is the monopsony wage in the case of risk-neutral ¯rms
so that the second term stands for the wage cut that risk-averse ¯rms levy
upon workers. It may be interpreted as the risk premium that ¯rms charge
to workers for the risk borne because of their commitment to wage and em-
ployment before the realization of uncertainty. This premium increases with
the worker productivity q as well as the density ¢ (as in the full-employment
case), whereas it decreases with the unemployment bene¯t b as well as with s
because, in either case, it is more di±cult for ¯rms to attract workers.
As expected, the level of unemployment rises with the unemployment ben-
e¯t. However, even in the absence of such a bene¯t (b = 0), there is still
unemployment as long as
L > n
q
s + À¢q2
and the risk premium remains positive.
In our setting, unemployment has two di®erent sources that combine to
generate its level, as shown by (14). The former is due to the mismatch of
¯rms and workers,5 whereas the latter is due to the uncertainty a®ecting the
5Strictly speaking, this is not a mismatch unemployment in the sense of the search-
matching literature (Pissarides, 2000) since, in equilibrium, all vacancies are ¯lled. There
is, in our model, an asymmetry between ¯rms and workers because, from the ¯rms' point
of view, the matching is e±cient whereas it is not for the workers. However, equilibrium
unemployment can be viewed as caused by mismatch between workers and ¯rms. Indeed,
because of initial skill mismatch, in equilibrium, utilities di®er across workers and is a
major cause for unemployment. More precisely, because workers are not initially perfectly
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price level. The ¯rst source of unemployment is due to ¯rms' market power in
the labor market. This statement must be quali¯ed, however. In a perfectly
competitive market, more workers would be employed because they would ben-
e¯t from a higher net wage. Indeed, imagine that at each location xi there is
not one but two ¯rms. This would obviously lead to Bertrand competition so
that wages would equal marginal productivity (wi = q). In this case, unem-
ployment is reduced but not vanish as long as q < b+ sL=2n. This discussion
has two major implications. First, our model illustrates in a very simple way
how market power on the labor market may generate unemployment. Second,
some workers may never be employable because, even at the competitive wage,
they are just too far away from ¯rms' job requirements. In other words, the
¯rst source of unemployment arises both because workers' skills are too far
from ¯rms' needs and because ¯rms exploit their market power in the labor
market.
Let us now come to the second source. We have just seen that demand un-
certainty leads ¯rms to lower their wages by charging a positive risk premium.
Stated di®erently, ¯rms use their market power to transfer the risk of price
volatility on workers, thus worsening unemployment. In order to highlight the
role of the second source of unemployment, consider the case of risk-neutral
¯rms (À = 0). Then (14) becomes
¢
Ã
L¡ nq ¡ b
s
!
It is readily veri¯ed that the unemployment level observed with risk-neutral
¯rms is lower than the one caused when both mismatch and price °uctuation
are combined, even though wages are higher. This suggests that, in a context
in which ¯rms must commit to wage and employment before observing the
realization of the product market uncertainty, unemployment is ampli¯ed when
¯rms are risk-averse. This is so because ¯rms pass the risk onto workers by
reducing wages. Hence, in our model, it appears that workers heterogeneity
and rigidities in the labor market gives rise to two forces which combine to
raise unemployment.
matched to ¯rms, they must bear the training costs corresponding to their initial mismatch,
thus implying that \mismatch" unemployment arises when these costs are too high for some
workers.
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It remains to consider the domain b+ sL=n · ©(q) · b+3sL=2n in which
Propositions 1 and 2 are no longer valid. Ever since Salop (1979) and oth-
ers, it is well known that the transition from one setting to the other goes
through some intermediate domain in which labor pools just touch in equilib-
rium. Hence, all workers are hired but the market context is di®erent from
the full-employment case discussed in section 3. In particular, the equilibrium
wage is no longer given by (7). To illustrate, we assume that ¯rms are risk-
neutral and show that all workers are hired at a wage equal to b+sL=2n:When
q = b + 3sL=2n, the equilibrium wage (7) is equal to b + sL=2n. Similarly,
when q = b + sL=n, the equilibrium wage (13) is equal to b + sL=2n. Hence,
the equilibrium wage is a continuous function of the structural parameters of
the economy. Thus, starting from a su±ciently large value of s such that there
is unemployment (q · b+ sL=n), a gradual decrease in s leads to a reduction
in unemployment, which vanishes when s satis¯es q = b + sL=n. Further de-
creases in s a®ects only wages which, ¯rst, decreases (b + sL=2n) and, then,
increases (q ¡ sL=n) up to the point where the level of marginal productivity
is reached (s = 0). The former e®ect ¯nds its origin in the fact that the equi-
librium arises at a kink in the labor supply function, whereas the latter is due
to the decrease in ¯rms' market power. Similar results may be obtained in the
case of risk-averse ¯rms, but the analysis is much more cumbersome.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have provided a unifying framework whose equilibrium dis-
plays full employment or unemployment according to the values of the struc-
tural parameters of the economy. As seen above, unemployment can be at-
tributed to imbalance in demand and supply of skills as well as to random
shocks in product demand that risk-adverse ¯rms must face. To reach this
conclusion, we have assumed that the labor market is imperfectly competitive
because both ¯rms and workers are heterogeneous. Demand uncertainty and
mismatch reinforce each other in generating unemployment. Our analysis has
also identi¯ed the impact of a few observable and structural parameters on
the labor market outcome. These predictions can lead to empirical tests. We
acknowledge the fact that we have used a partial equilibrium model but we
see no reasons for the general tendencies uncovered here to become invalid in
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a general equilibrium setting, although the details will be di®erent. Further-
more, when there is free entry with ¯xed entry costs so that the number of
¯rms becomes endogenous, the number of active ¯rms will remain ¯nite and,
for su±ciently large ¯xed costs, unemployment will prevail in the conditions
described in Proposition 2.6
Our model provides a natural framework to evaluate the impact of vari-
ous policy instruments. First, the implications of a minimum wage legislation
are easy to trace. The government should institute a minimum wage above
the monopsony one. Such a minimum wage would reduce ¯rms' monopsony
power and induce more workers to accept `decently paid' jobs. This sheds
some additional lights on the recent debate revolving around the positive ef-
fects of the minimum wage in the US (Card and Krueger, 1995) as well as in
Europe (Dolado et al., 1996). Second, the literature does not give a clear an-
swer to whether the government should cut unemployment bene¯ts (Atkinson
and Micklewright, 1991). Assume that the unemployment bene¯t is ¯nanced
by a lump-sum tax paid by ¯rms. In such a context, it is readily veri¯ed that
the level of unemployment is as given in section 4. Therefore, more workers
are willing to take a job rather than to stay unemployed when the unemploy-
ment bene¯t is reduced. This is because a reduction in unemployment bene¯t
strengthens ¯rms' monopsony power.
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